INTRODUCTION
There is no fundamental difference of kind in the control requirements between a small and a large accelerator since they are built of the same types of components, which individually have the same types of control inputs and outputs. The main difference is one of scale; the large machine has many more components of each type, and the distances involved are much greater.
It is the purpose of this paper to look at the special control problems of large accelerators, which I shall arbitrarily define as those with a length or circumference in excess of 10 km, and point out where special developments, or the adoption of developments from outside the accelerator control field, can be of assistance in minimizing the cost of the control system. SIGNAL CABLING One of the obvious problems created by the size of a large accelerator is that the lengths of many of the cables, particularly those that have to go round the machine tunnel, increase proportionately and, if nothing is done to reduce their number, the cabling costs for a big machine can become very large. The magnitude of this can be seen from one example. The cost of the signal cables installed initially for the SPS at CERN was about 6 MSF. If the same system were to be used for LEP, the cable cost would be of the order of 30 MSF (about $15M at the time this estimate was made) due both to the increased cable lengths and the increased number of components.
The main means of reducing the number of cables is by multiplexing. In many existing control systems, a number of devices are multiplexed into a single cable for a particular service. This can be extended into multiplexing several services into a single cable. The services requiring signalling cabling round the machine can be divided into two types, those mainly analogic, such as audio and video communications and waveform signals, and those mainly digital, such as links between computers and equipment, terminals and other computers, as well as status and interlock information. There are a number of methods of allowing different services to share the same cable but these usually either require the analog data to be digitized, or the digital data be used to modulate an analog signal. These methods can be divided into two .nain classes, designated by the method used to share the cable. These are known as Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) and Time Division Multiplexing (TDM).
The main difference between these two is that FDM gives each service the exclusive use of a portion of the total bandwidth of the transmission medium, while TDM gives each service the full bandwidth for a portion of the total time. FDM has been used mainly for the transmission of analog signals which are used to modulate an RF carrier, to produce an "upconverted" version of the analog signal, occupying a band of frequencies adjacent to the carrier frequency. By Thus, modeling is essential to determine the adjustments necessary to achieve an adequate dynamic aperture: random adjustments can too easily result in a divergent situation.
However, unless new techniques are developed, the complexity of the computations required for modeling goes up rapidly with the number of components that can affect the beam, with a corresponding increase in the computer power needed to carry them out in a time short enough to be useful in setting up the machine. The distributed control system should have sufficient power to gather and format the beam diagnostic data in the order of a second, but it may then be necessary to pass this data to a specialized computer or array processor, which is either part of the control system or a facility of the central computing services of the laboratory. In a recent estimate of the computing needs for theSSC3 the need for the full time use of a computer of the class of a CRAY 1S for the design calculations was expressed. If such a machine is obtained for this purpose then, once the design is complete, it could be coupled to the control system network for the on-line modeling activities.
The criticality of the parameters of a large machine also means that, in the case of a ring where the injected beam has to be accelerated up to the storage energy, the tolerances on the tracking of the various elements during ramping have to be very tight, and this must be taken into account in the design of the power supplies, interface and timing systems. RELIABILITY As the size of a machine and the number of components increases, the reliability of the individual components must increase if the operating efficiency, defined as the ratio of actual to scheduled time of operation, is to be maintained. An average efficiency of 90% can be achieved with existing medium sized accelerators and if the control system is not responsible for more than a tenth of the down time it can be considered to be sufficiently reliable.4 Reliability of a component can be improved by increasing the mean time before failure (MTBF) of that type of component, and reducing the mean time to repair (MTR), which includes the time to diagnose the fault and then to repair or replace the faulty component. In the case of a large accelerator, the time taken to get to the locality of the faulty component can be a significant part of the MTR.
The complexity of electronic equipment, especially computers and allied equipment, has increased enormously over the last decade, but this has not been accompanied by a decrease in reliability; on the contrary, reliability has generally increased. There are several reasons for this, one of the main ones being the increased integration on a single chip, allowing a reduction in the number of separate components and their interconnections, particularly those made by means of plugs and sockets, which are frequently the source of trouble. A computer that would have needed a complete crate of separate boards a short while ago can now be fitted on to a single board, and will shortly be available on a single chip. The increased integration has also allowed a certain amount of redundancy to be incorporated to overcome faults, such as in self-correcting memory.
One way of increasing the reliability of a control system is by duplication or triplication of the equipment, but this is normally not economically justifiable for an accelerator system, with the possible exception of those parts involving protection of personnel. As computer hardware nowadays is no less reliable than the interface, cabling and sensors, duplication of the whole system is needed to get appreciable gain. Instead, the system should be examined for possible sources of failure, and means of eliminating or reducing them sought, to increase the MTBF. This can include making sure that components are run well within their ratings and that careful attention is paid to the thermal environment, as the MTBF of electronic components increases if they are run well below their maximum allowable ambient temperature. Even small doses of radiation can reduce the reliability of integrated circuits, and every attempt should be made to keep electronic equipment out of the radiation areas. Where it cannot be avoided, r4diation-hardened components should be used, but even these become unreliable after doses of ten to a hundred kilorads. The extra expense of using components to military specifications generally in the control system is not likely to be justified, unless the price differential is reduced substantially in the future.
An attack on the MTR can also give significant results.
Very often the diagnosis of a fault takes longer than its repair, which emphasizes the importance of comprehensive test and diagnosis programs. As mentioned above, the provision of processing power in the equipment and interface allows diagnostic programs to examine the functioning of the system down to the lowest levels. All equipment should be in modular form for easy removal, and recovery from a fault should be by exchange of modules, rather than repair on the spot.
Electronic equipment cannot operate reliably with unreliable power, and this is another area which requires careful attention. With a large accelerator, the control system is required to monitor and control the electrical distribution system, and so at least part of it requires a secure supply, with sufficient autonomy to maintain safety systems and carry out recovery procedures in the case of a major power outage.
As more and more integrated circuits are becoming available in CMOS form, without significant loss of speed as far as control applications are concerned, but with a small fraction of the power consumption of the present equipment, it becomes realistic to consider powering parts of the control system by sealed rechargeable batteries. Normally, the batteries would be floating, the power being supplied by a charger from the mains. A discussion of the alternative solutions for the control problems of this machine will be given in an enlarged version of this paper to be issued as a SLAC report.
